We study the informational role of corporate hedging. We compare two alternative hypotheses. Under the "opacity" hypothesis, corporate hedging makes earnings less informative, thus rendering the firm more opaque to the market, and increasing the profitability of more informed traders. Under the "transparency" hypothesis, corporate hedging, by reducing uncertainty about firm value, erodes the information advantage of the more informed traders, thus limiting their profitability. We test these hypotheses using a novel data set on short sales of US equities over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009], and hand-collected data on corporate hedging. Our tests support the "transparency" hypothesis. We document that hedging is associated with lower uncertainty (lower analyst forecast dispersion, greater breadth of institutional ownership, and lower option-implied stock price volatility). Hedging is also associated with a lower intensity of informed trading in general, and in particular of short selling. Furthermore, short selling profits are more than two times lower on the stocks of firms that engage in corporate hedging.
Introduction
The debate on the use of financial derivatives by corporate America has raged in recent years.
Typically, non-financial firms enter derivatives contracts as part of their risk management policye.g., to limit exposure to foreign exchange or interest rate risk. A number of commentators have raised concerns that the complexity of derivatives can reduce the reliability of financial statements, for instance by tempting managers to use fanciful assumptions in their accounting treatment, or to withhold critical information needed to understand them. Echoing these views, Warren Buffet famously worried that marking-to-market of derivatives positions may degenerate into "mark-tomyth" (Buffett, 2002) . More in general, there is a widespread concern among practitioners that the corporate use of derivatives, or "corporate hedging", rather than reducing risk, actually harms transparency in the stock market (Chasan, (2013) ).
1 Does corporate hedging have a measurable effect on transparency, or are practitioner concerns unsubstantiated? While the literature has analyzed the determinants of corporate hedging and its relationship to firm policies via channels such as taxes, bankruptcy risk, or financial constraints (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) , Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) , Tufano (1996) , Graham and Smith (1999) ), this question has been until now largely unexplored. This is all the more surprising, as corporate hedging has become a first-order economic phenomenon. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the combined notional value of outstanding interest rate (IR) and foreign exchange (FX) derivatives held by nonfinancial companies rose nearly five-fold since the turn of the century (from $9.4 trillion in 2000 to $44.4 trillion as of December 2012), and most of the world's largest companies use derivatives for risk management (Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2004) ).
In this paper, we try to shed light on the information effects of corporate hedging using a twopronged approach. First, we analyze the impact of hedging on agreement between market participants and analysts. Second, we study whether hedging affects the ability of informed traders to profit from 1 "Corporate disclosures on hedge accounting and derivatives trading are so opaque that investors are often unable to see the true risks companies face when engaging in those activities" (Chasan, 2013) . their information, exploiting a novel data set which allows us to track the trading activity of one key class of informed traders: short sellers.
A first hypothesis is that corporate hedging may indeed render the firm more opaque. This would be consistent with some of the above mentioned practitioner concerns. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the market reacts negatively when companies suffer losses on their derivatives positions. receive or pay to liquidate a contract, and thus simply provide information on recent price movements, rather than the actual amounts held (Graham and Roger (2002) ). The lack of information on the hedging activities may make earnings less forecastable, and reduce transparency.
Furthermore, corporate hedging could allow managers to support unprofitable lines of business, hide negative information from the scrutiny of directors and investors, and smooth, or even manipulate earnings (Bodnar et al. (1995) , Barton (2001) , Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) ). From this perspective, corporate hedging would increase information asymmetry between managers and investors, and leave the market wondering about the real motives behind the hedging strategy. The greater uncertainty and information asymmetry would create an ideal space of action for the short sellers. In a similar spirit, Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2001) find a positive association between short interest and discretionary accruals. In other words, corporate hedging, by making the firm more opaque, can increase the short sellers' ability to profit, and therefore increase their incentive to be active on hedging firms. We refer to this as the "opacity" hypothesis.
An alternative view relies on the role played by corporate hedging in the presence of information asymmetry between the firm and the market (DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) ). Hedging "macro" risks (FX, interest rate) becomes important if the firm's exposure -i.e., the economic sensitivity of the firm's cash flows and value to such risks -is uncertain, and there is information asymmetry between the firm and the market -i.e., managers possess information about future cash flows that is not available to the investors.
3 This makes it difficult for the investors to limit risk exposure via diversification. Corporate hedging, thus, provides investors with protection against risk that they cannot themselves diversify given their lack of information (DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) ).
Furthermore, hedging, by removing extraneous noise, improves the informativeness of earnings as a signal of managerial ability or the quality of the firm's investments (DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) ).
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These arguments would be consistent with findings in the literature that firms use hedging primarily to limit, not to increase, risk (Guay (1999) , Zhang (2009) ). More in general, they suggest that corporate hedging reduces information asymmetry between the managers and the investors, as well as between informed investors -such as the short sellers -and other market participants.
The lower information asymmetry should erode the advantage of more informed traders in the market, by making it less profitable to exploit their superior ability to process information compared to other market participants. 5 Throughout the paper, we refer to this as the "transparency" hypothesis.
The preceding hypotheses can be compared against the null that corporate hedging is irrelevant in terms of information. Indeed, hedging contracts are designed to limit the firm's exposure to "macro" sources of risk -e.g., interest rate or foreign exchange shocks. Information-based strategies, in contrast, are primarily driven by firm-specific risk. Thus, intuitively, the removal of macro risks from a stock should not matter for firm transparency.
These considerations motivate our testable predictions. The opacity hypothesis posits that corporate hedging increases information asymmetry between the firm and the market, and among market participants. This should be reflected greater disagreement among equity analysts and among investors, as well as, more in general, in greater uncertainty about firm value. The increased uncertainty will raise the ability of informed traders to profit from their private information, so we should observe both a higher informed trading intensity, as well as greater returns to informed traders.
The transparency hypothesis makes the opposite predictions: corporate hedging should be associated with a lower level of information asymmetry, a lower informed trading intensity, and lower profitability for informed traders.
We test these predictions exploiting a unique, novel data set that combines hand-collected data about corporate hedging with detailed short selling information on US firms, over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Previous studies on corporate hedging have focused on specific industries (e.g. gold mining in Tufano (1996) , or airlines in Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012) ) or corporate events (e.g.
initiation of derivatives use in Guay (1999) , or private loan agreements in Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) ). Our hedging data, on the other hand, cover the full universe of US publicly listed nonfinancial firms, over the entire sample period.
In addition, we can directly test for the impact of corporate hedging on (a class of) informed traders, by observing short selling activity. Short-sellers have been shown to either have superior information compared to other market participants, or are better able to process public information, and that their trades predict future stock returns (e.g., Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007 ), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008 ), Boehmer, Reka, and Jordan (2010 , Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) ). Importantly, we are able to rely on information on both the demand and supply of shares in the market for equity short sales -i.e. the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling, as well as the quantity available for lending. This allows us to focus on the behavior of the short sellers, while controlling for any supply-side or selection effects (e.g., Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007)).
Simultaneity and reverse causality are potential sources of concern for any empirical analysis of corporate decisions, including hedging decisions. These issues are attenuated in our study, as the main dependent variables in our tests (proxies for dispersion of opinion, informed trading intensity, and short selling returns) are not firm choices, but the result of investor beliefs and trading behavior. Yet, the firm's decision to enter derivatives contracts for hedging could in principle be driven by considerations such as, for example, the expected impact on short selling pressure. To alleviate this problem, and following the indications of the corporate hedging literature, we rely on an exogenous source of variation in the incentives to corporate hedging that arises from salient institutional features of the U.S. tax system, based on corporate income tax convexity.
A convex tax schedule creates an incentive for the firm to hedge, as hedging limits the fluctuations in corporate taxable income, resulting in a lower tax bill (e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985) , Graham and Smith (1999) ). Indeed, tax convexity has been used as an instrument for corporate hedging, for example by Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) . While the tax schedule's curvature need not be the only reason why the firm hedges, and alternative determinants have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) , Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ), we find tax convexity to be an empirically important driver of hedging: one standard-deviation increase in the tax convexity index is associated with up to a 17% higher propensity to corporate hedging. At the same time, the tax incentive to hedge is unlikely to have a first-order direct impact on uncertainty around firm value or informed trading, thus providing an ideal instrument for our tests. We can thus implement an instrumental variable estimator that achieves identification by exploiting tax-related nonlinearities in the incentives to corporate hedging.
Building on the above arguments, and relying on this identification strategy, we take our hypotheses to the data. Overall, the evidence rejects the opacity hypothesis, and is in line with the transparency hypothesis.
First, corporate hedging is related to lower dispersion of opinion, translating into greater agreement among financial analysts and investors. Corporate hedging is associated with a 14% lower analyst forecast dispersion, as well as a 4% higher breadth of institutional ownership (Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) This suggests that one main channel of impact of corporate hedging is to reduce the scope of action of the insiders and more informed traders. However, PIN and R-square are broad and indirect proxies for informed trading. While informed trading is, in general, hard to measure, our data allows us to directly observe the trading activity of one class of informed investors: short sellers. We find that corporate hedgers experience a 30% lower short selling intensity on their stocks. Importantly, the effect is mainly driven by the demand of shares to borrow for short selling. In contrast, the supply of shares available for lending appears largely unrelated to corporate hedging, attenuating any concerns about the selection of corporate hedgers.
The transparency hypothesis further predicts that the reduced short selling intensity should be driven by lower profitability of short selling the stocks of hedging firms. And indeed, this is what we find. One standard-deviation increase in short selling is associated with a stock price drop of about 1% over a 6-month period on the stocks of corporate hedgers, and of nearly 2.5% on non-hedgers. In other words, short selling profits are more than two times larger in the absence of corporate hedging.
The interesting question is how corporate hedging affects short selling profits. The tests discussed so far point to a specific channel: they suggest that hedging reduces information asymmetry. This should erode the informational advantage of the short sellers, resulting in lower expected profits. We provide one final piece of evidence consistent with this argument, comparing the efficiency of the providers of public information -i.e. equity analysts -to the private information possessed by the short sellers. We find that analyst recommendation revisions in the period subsequent to a short sale are smaller for hedging firms. Over the 6-month period subsequent to a short sale, analyst recommendations are revised from a "neutral" recommendation to a "strong sell" for non-hedging firms. In contrast, recommendations are essentially unchanged for hedging firms. This suggests that analyst recommendations already incorporate to a large extent the information of the short sellers, whose informational advantage is thus eroded.
In sum, corporate hedging is associated with a lower dispersion of opinion among market participants. It also relates to a lower intensity of informed trading, and specifically of short selling. In turn, this appears to be driven by lower expected returns to informed traders, whose informational advantage vis-à-vis providers of public information (equity analysts) is reduced. Taken together, these findings provide strong support for the transparency hypothesis.
Our study makes three main contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on corporate hedging. The mandatory disclosure of hedging policies in firms' annual reports in recent years has led to several works on the determinants of hedging (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996) , Guay (1999), and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand, (1997) (2008 ), Boehmer, Reka, and Jordan (2010 , Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) ). Our contribution is to show that corporate hedging actually makes short selling less profitable, by eroding the information advantage of the short sellers vis-à-vis other market participants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the data, our main variables of interest, and the econometric approach. In Section III, we consider the relation between corporate hedging and the dispersion of opinion among analysts and stock market participants. In Section IV, we look at the impact of corporate hedging on informed trading, and in particular on short selling activity.
In Section V, we analyze the link between hedging and short selling profitability. A brief conclusion follows.
II. Data, Main Variables of Interest, and Identification Approach
We merge data from multiple sources. The data on corporate hedging has been hand-collected from the 10-K and 10-Q statements, while the data on short selling are obtained from the DataExplorers 
A. Corporate Hedging Data
The data on corporate hedging are hand-collected from firms' annual and quarterly reports. To identify firms engaging in corporate hedging, we first restrict the attention to a set of firm-year observations identified on the basis of a keyword search through the 10-K and 10-Q filings. 7 We then manually screen the resulting filings, to eliminate false matches. We search the filings of the universe of firms in the Compustat/CRSP Merged database over our sample period, excluding financial firms (with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999). When searching for interest rate hedging activities, we restrict the attention to the filings containing at least three instances of one of the following keywords: "interest rate swap", "interest rate cap", "interest rate collar", "interest rate floor", "interest rate forward", "interest rate option", and "interest rate future." 10 In addition, we exclude from the search filings containing keywords such as "we (the company) do not (does not) have (utilize, enter) any interest rate derivatives." The resulting filings are then screened to eliminate any misclassifications, and the remaining ones are considered interest rate (IR) hedgers. 7 We include both the main filings and their amendments in the search. 8 Financial firms typically use derivatives for trading purposes besides hedging, which could potentially confound our tests. 9 Our short-selling data start from 2002, in which Financial Accounting Standards Board SFAS (1998) 133 became effective. As mentioned before, SFAS 133 does not require the disclosure of the notional amounts of derivatives. We therefore rely on indicator variables to identify hedging, rather than the notional amounts. 10 The filter that derivatives instruments must be mentioned at least 3 times in the company's 10-K or 10-Q filing helps us to narrow down to the firms that truly engage in hedging activities.
Similarly, for the case of foreign exchange hedging, we focus on filings containing at least three instances of the following keywords: "foreign exchange forward", "forward foreign exchange", "foreign exchange rate forward", "currency forward", "currency rate forward", "foreign exchange option", "currency option", "foreign exchange rate option", "currency rate option", "foreign exchange future", "currency future", "foreign exchange rate future", "currency rate future", "foreign exchange swap", "currency swap", "foreign exchange rate swap", "currency rate swap", "foreign exchange cap", "currency cap", "foreign exchange rate cap", "currency rate cap", "foreign exchange collar", "currency collar", "foreign exchange rate collar", "currency rate collar", "foreign exchange floor", "currency floor", "foreign exchange rate floor", and "currency rate floor." As in the case of IR hedging, we also filter out filings containing phrases such as "we (the company) do not (does not) have (utilize, enter) any foreign exchange derivatives." The resulting filings are then manually screened for misclassifications, and the remaining ones are considered foreign exchange (FX) hedgers. Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) , who find in their corporate loan data 36% of IR hedgers, 27% of FX hedgers, and 50% of hedgers of either kind. If we break down the sample along the dimensions of size and book-to-market (Table I , panel C), we observe that hedging is relatively more common among large firms, as well as among firms with higher book-to-market ratio; we thus control for size and book-to-market throughout the analysis.
B. Short Selling Data
We obtain equity lending data from DataExplorers, a privately owned financial data and software company that supplies financial benchmarking information to the securities lending industry and short-side intelligence to investment managers. DataExplorers collects data from custodians and prime brokers that lend and borrow securities, and is the leading provider of securities lending data, tracking short selling and institutional fund activity across all global market sectors (Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) For each stock, we retrieve from DataExplorers the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling, the utilization ratio (the percentage of lendable shares that are actually borrowed for short selling), and the lendable quantity (the number of shares available for lending, but not necessarily on loan).
Combining these data with the CRSP/Compustat merged data base, we are able to track a sample of 6084 stocks, or 331,232 stock-month observations over our sample period.
We consider alternative short selling intensity proxies. Our two main variables of interest are Short selling and Utilization ratio. For a given stock, on a given calendar month, Short selling is defined as the ratio of the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling, divided by the number of shares outstanding. 11 The Utilization ratio is defined as the ratio of the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling divided by the number of shares available for lending, and thus gauges the intensity of short selling, while controlling for the availability of lendable shares, i.e. for the "supply" side. In addition, we also consider a placebo test based on the Lendable ratio, defined as the ratio of the supply of shares available for lending divided by the number of shares outstanding. Table I reports summary statistics about these measures in panels A (monthly data), B (yearly data), C and D (average by size and book-to-market portfolios). Short selling represents, in a given month, about 2.5% of the total outstanding shares for the average firm. The monthly trading volume is about 14% of outstanding shares on average over our sample period (based on CRSP data), implying that short selling accounts for about 20% of trading volume. These figures are in line with the findings of Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), who report that short selling transactions account for 24% of all NYSE trades and 31% of all NASDAQ trades. While in the typical month there is little short selling 11 We retrieve the number of shares outstanding from CRSP.
on any given stock, short selling intensity can be as large as 20% of the outstanding shares as a yearly average (panel B).
C. Other Variables of Interest
We relate corporate hedging to proxies for the intensity of informed trading (PIN, return R-square), to short selling intensity (Short selling and Utilization ratio, defined above), to stock (excess) returns, and to proxies for uncertainty (option-implied volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, and analyst recommendation revisions subsequent to short sales) and agreement among investors (breadth of ownership).
The PIN is the probability of informed trading implied by the structural model of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) . The return R-square is defined as the R-square from a regression of weekly stock returns on market and industry returns, estimated year by year for each stock (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2002)).
Excess returns are defined as the monthly stock return minus the return on a matching size and book-to-market portfolio. Stock returns are obtained from CRSP, and the returns on the matching size and book-to-market portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French's website. All these variables and the full set of control variables used in the analysis, are defined in greater detail in Appendix B.
Implied volatility is defined as the yearly median implied volatility across all option contracts on the firm's stock. Option pricing and implied volatility data are retrieved from the OptionMetrics database. OptionMetrics is a comprehensive source of historical price and implied volatility data for the U.S. equity options market. We rely on the "Standardized Option Price" file, containing information on standardized options. It reports information on at-the-money options with expirations of 30, 60, 91, 122, 152, 182, 365, 547, 730, 912 , and 1095 calendar days.
Analyst forecast dispersion is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of IBES analyst EPS forecasts to the previous-month stock price, averaged over one calendar year. Monthly analyst recommendations are also retrieved from IBES, and are categorized on a scale from 1 ("strong buy") to 5 ("strong sell").
Finally, breadth of ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of mutual funds holding a given stock to the total number of mutual funds active in the U.S. equity market (Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2002)), as well as the ratio of the number of 13F institutional investors holding a given stock to the total number of 13F institutional investors active in the U.S. equity market.
D. Identification Issues
As in any study of the effects of corporate risk management, one potential difficulty in testing our empirical predictions is endogeneity, in the form of omitted variables bias, simultaneity, and reverse causality. To control for the potential omitted variables bias, throughout the analysis we rely on the indications of the literature and control for the main determinants of short selling and uncertainty,including among our control variables firm size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity), book-to-market, profitability (cash flow), debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio, prior return, and institutional ownership (cf. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) ).
An additional potential concern is the scope for simultaneity and reverse causality. For instance, corporate hedging policy, uncertainty, and short selling, could be jointly determined in equilibrium, or driven by some common economic factor. This concern is attenuated in our tests, given that the outcome variables proxying for uncertainty (Implied volatility, Analyst forecast dispersion, Breadth of ownership) and short selling intensity (Short selling, Utilization ratio) are not firm choices, but are determined by the beliefs and behavior of investors and equity analysts. Moreover, the corporate hedging indicators, as well as all the control variables, enter all the regressions with a one-year lag,
i.e. they are predetermined. Furthermore, in addition to the control variables mentioned above, all the regressions also include calendar date (year or month, depending on the specification) indicators, so as to control for the effect of any macroeconomic condition that could jointly affect corporate hedging, uncertainty, and informed trading.
These checks might, however, still leave open the possibility of reverse causality. For example, if corporate hedging improves transparency, it could be the case that the more opaque firms, characterized by high uncertainty about their value, opt to hedge in order to become more transparent.
However , this would suggest a positive relationship between opacity and hedging, while our results find the opposite.
In order to fully address the potential concern for endogeneity, following the literature we resort to an instrument for corporate hedging based on a salient institutional feature of the U.S. corporate tax code: corporate income tax convexity (Graham and Smith (1999) , Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011)). Tax convexity derives from the nonlinear treatment assigned to corporate earnings in the tax code (different tax brackets), the existence of net operating loss carryforwards and carrybacks, investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The tax convexity estimation of Graham and Smith (1999) captures all of these features of the tax code, and measures the expected tax savings from hedging. Importantly, not all firms face the same tax convexities, nor do they derive equal potential benefits by hedging for tax reasons. This cross-sectional heterogeneity in corporate hedgingrelated expected tax benefits forms the basis of our identification strategy.
Following Graham and Smith (1999) and Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) 
where TIVol is the volatility of taxable income, TICorr is the serial correlation of taxable income, DITC is a dummy for investment tax credits, DNOL is a dummy for net operating losses, DSmallNeg (DSmallPos) is a dummy for small negative (positive) taxable income. The index can be interpreted as the expected percentage savings in tax liability arising from a 5% reduction in taxable income volatility Smith (1999), p. 2256) . All the inputs of the index are defined in greater detail in Appendix B. Importantly, the Graham-Smith index focuses on data from a range of realizations close to the zero-income tax kink. This implies that the power of our instrument to identify corporate hedging in that region comes from the nonlinear form of the income tax, rather than from the level of income itself (Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011)) . Indeed, the level of corporate income (Cash flow) is included as a control variable in all regressions.
A greater tax convexity provides incentives for the firm to hedge, and a priori there is no reason to expect it to have a direct, first-order effect on the level of uncertainty, informed trading, or short selling intensity. Thus, tax convexity is a plausible instrument for corporate hedging in the uncertainty and informed trading regressions presented below. Prior studies have found support for the claim that firms hedge to minimize taxes, indicating tax convexity as an important driver of hedging (e.g.
Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011), Dionne and Garand (2003) , Dionne and Triki (2005) ). 12 One potential concern with the instrument is that it could be related to cash flow volatility, which in turn could be related to uncertainty on firm value (although not directly to short selling intensity).
Following Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011), to attenuate this concern we replicate the entire analysis expunging from the index the TIVol component. The results are consistent with the ones we report below, suggesting that we rely on independent variation coming from the tax-based instrument.
To validate the strength of our instrument, we test for the impact of Convexity on the corporate hedging policy. (2011), and suggests that the Convexity index explains a substantial fraction of the observed variation in corporate hedging.
12 Graham and Rogers (2002) only find weak evidence of this effect. We validate the strength of our instrument by directly examining its impact on corporate hedging in the tests presented in Table II . 13 These economic effects are evaluated as follows. The estimates of Table II , column (1), imply that one standard deviation increase in Convexity is associated with an increase in the probability to engage in IR and/or FX hedging by about 3.5 percentage points. The IR/FX hedging indicator equals 1 for about 30% of all sample observations. Taking this as the baseline probability that the firm is an IR/FX hedger yields a 3.5/30 11.67% increase. Analogous calculations yield the other economic effects discussed.
Column (4) augments the probit specification in the case of FX hedging, including as additional controls the Foreign income ratio (the impact of foreign profits on overall net income) and the indicator variable No foreign income (Y/N), equal to one when the firm does not have any foreign profits. These two variables help control for the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure due to its foreign operations, and are important determinants of the decision to engage in FX hedging, as evidenced by the estimates. Also in this specification, a greater tax convexity index is associated with an increased propensity to hedge.
The identification strategy outlined in this section allows us to address the potential endogeneity of corporate hedging in the remainder of the analysis. The next step is to verify if hedging has an impact on the information environment of the firm. We look at this in the next section.
III. Corporate Hedging and Dispersion of Opinion
We start by relating hedging to dispersion of opinion among analysts and market participants. First, we focus on two direct proxies for dispersion of opinion: analyst forecast dispersion and breadth of (institutional) ownership. Analyst forecast dispersion proxies for the amount of disagreement among the analysts following the firm. To the extent that there is less agreement among analysts about future earnings, they face greater uncertainty, suggesting lack of transparency. Breadth of (institutional) ownership, on the other hand, is a proxy for investors' views, based on their holdings. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) define it as the fraction of all US equity mutual funds that actually hold a given firm's stocks. We complement this measure with an analogous one, based on the entire universe of institutional investors in the Thomson Reuters 13F database. A higher breadth of ownership implies that a larger fraction of the firm's "potential" shareholders agree about its valuation -i.e. investors are less uncertain about firm value.
Second, we consider a more general proxy for information asymmetry and uncertainty: optionimplied stock price volatility. Implied volatility gauges the uncertainty surrounding firm value to the eyes of investors (e.g., Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006) . Compared to potential alternative proxies, such as idiosyncratic volatility or cash flow volatility, it has the advantage of being forward-looking in nature, so that it reflects the market's expectations.
If corporate hedging is associated with a lower information asymmetry, as predicted by the transparency hypothesis, the market for the shares of corporate hedgers should be characterized by lower dispersion of opinion, both among analysts and investors. We should thus expect lower Analyst forecast dispersion and greater Breadth of ownership, as well as lower Implied volatility. In contrast, the opacity hypothesis predicts that hedging will associate with a higher Analyst forecast dispersion, lower Breadth of ownership, and higher Implied volatility. We thus estimate a regression of the general form: Graham and Smith (1999) ) is used as an instrument for corporate hedging. 15 Since our hedging proxy is a binary variable, we rely on the "treatment regression" methodology to achieve greater estimation precision (Maddala (1983) , Cameron and Trivedi (2009)). This method jointly estimates via maximum likelihood two equations.
The first one corresponds to the probit equations reported in Table II , where the proxy for hedging is regressed on tax convexity and the full set of control variables. In the second one, the dispersion of opinion proxy (Analyst forecast dispersion, Breadth of ownership, Implied volatility) is regressed on the instrumented hedging indicator.
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The estimates of equation (1) In sum, the evidence presented in this section indicates that corporate hedging associates with a reduction in dispersion of opinion. This appears to reject the opacity hypothesis, and is more consistent with the transparency hypothesis. We should therefore expect a lower informed trading intensity, as the expected profits to informed traders are lower. The following sections test this prediction, analyzing the effect of hedging on informed trading intensity.
IV. Corporate Hedging and Informed Trading Intensity
In this section we test if the lower dispersion of opinions and greater transparency translate in less trading by more informed investors. First, we consider two general but indirect proxies for informed trading intensity (PIN and Return R-square). Second, we turn to and a direct proxy, based on short trades.
The first indirect proxy is the Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) probability of informed trading (PIN). The PIN is an estimate of the likelihood of trading against an informed trader. The 16 An alternative approach would be to estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is the hedging indicator and the set of explanatory variables includes Convexity, then take the predicted values from this model, and use them as an instrument for the hedging indicator in linear two-stage least squares (Wooldridge (2003) ). This approach yields similar results (unreported for brevity). 17 The implied economic effects are based on the OLS estimates, and are obtained as the ratio of the coefficient estimate to the average of the dependent variable. The effects mentioned in the text are based on the IR/FX indicator. Similar effects obtain with the IR and FX indicators.
second proxy is the return R-square -i.e. the R-square from a regression of stock returns on the market and industry indexes. A higher return R-square suggests that relatively few investors are trading on firm-specific information, as a larger component of stock price movements is accounted for by market and industry returns (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2002) ). The transparency hypothesis predicts that corporate hedgers will have lower PIN and higher return R-square; the opacity hypothesis makes the opposite predictions. We therefore estimate: (2) with both OLS and the maximum likelihood treatment regression (IV) method, in the latter case using the Convexity index as instrument.
The estimates for the PIN and return R-square regressions are reported in Table IV . They support the transparency hypothesis, and reject the opacity hypothesis: corporate hedging is associated with a reduced likelihood of informed trading, in terms of a lower PIN and a higher return R-square.
Furthermore, the effect is economically meaningful: the PIN is 2% lower, and the return R-square 2%
higher, for hedging firms.
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The PIN and return R-square are broad, but indirect proxies for informed trading. Therefore, as a next step, we directly focus on the trading behavior of informed traders: the short-sellers. Table V reports the estimates of model (2), where the dependent variable is a short selling proxy, Short selling or Utilization ratio. 20 Across all the specifications, short selling proxies, and hedging indicators, we find a negative relationship between corporate hedging and short selling intensity. The estimates imply that hedging firms face a 30% lower short selling intensity. This suggests that the impact of hedging is consistent with the predictions of the transparency hypothesis, and can be economically substantial.
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Under both the transparency and opacity hypotheses, corporate hedging affects the short sellers' expected profits, and should thus affect the demand for shares to sell short -but not their supply. In other words, the shares made available for lending should not be affected by short-seller profitability.
Therefore, as a "placebo" test, we relate hedging to the Lendable ratio -i.e., the ratio of the number of shares available for lending to the total outstanding shares. The estimates are reported in Panel C of Table V . Consistent with our argument, they display a generally insignificant, and economically small, effect of corporate hedging on the Lendable ratio.
22
Taken together, these results are consistent with the empirical predictions of the transparency hypothesis, and suggest that corporate hedging is associated with a lower intensity of informed trading, and in particular of short selling. The next question is to verify whether corporate hedging indeed associates with lower expected informed trading profits. While in general informed trades are difficult to observe, our data allow us to zero-in on a specific class of informed traders: the short sellers. In the next section, we thus look at their expected profits.
V. Stock Returns Following Short Sales and Corporate Hedging
To test whether short selling profitability is reduced in the presence of corporate hedging, we study if short selling intensity predicts future stock returns, and how the predictive power of short selling is related to corporate hedging. 23 We estimate a series of regressions of characteristic-adjusted stock returns in months 1, 2, … , 6 on short selling intensity in month :
21 The estimate is based on the IR/FX indicator, and refers to its impact on Short selling. Effects of similar magnitudes obtain using the IR and FX indicators. The implied effect of the IR/FX indicator on the Utilization ratio is a 20% decrease (relative to the average of Utilization ratio), with again effects of similar magnitudes for the IR and FX indicators. 22 The effect of corporate hedging on the Lendable ratio is never significant in the instrumental variables specifications. It is also insignificant in the OLS specification based on the IR/FX indicator. While the OLS coefficient on the IR hedger indicator is statistically significant, the implied economic effect is considerably smaller than the effects on Short selling and Utilization ratio, and becomes insignificant in the instrumental variables specification. 23 As other studies in the literature (e.g. Boehmer, Husza, and Jordan (2010)), we use the returns subsequent to short sales as proxies for the short sellers' profits. The estimates are reported in Table VI, The impact of hedging on short sellers' profits is also economically meaningful. One standarddeviation increase in Short selling is associated with a 6-month drop in the stock price (6-month cumulative excess return) of about 2.5% for non-hedging firms, but of only about 1% for hedging firms, implying that short selling profits are more than two times larger in the absence of corporate hedging.
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Thus, short selling is typically less profitable on the stocks of hedging firms. How can corporate hedging reduce the profitability of short selling? The evidence discussed so far points to a specific channel: the erosion of the informed traders' (short sellers') informational advantage, due to the reduced information asymmetry that derives from corporate hedging. If corporate hedging creates a level playing-field between the short sellers' private information and the public information available to the entire market, the short sellers' profits will be reduced. We provide one last piece of evidence consistent with this argument, comparing the efficiency of the providers of public informationnamely, equity analysts, to the private information of the short sellers.
To do so, we look at analyst recommendation revisions subsequent to short sales. To the extent that corporate hedging limits the short sellers' information advantage, analyst recommendations for corporate hedgers should be closer to the private information possessed by the short sellers. Thus, recommendation revisions should be smaller in the period subsequent to a short sale. In contrast, in 26 These effects are computed as follows. The monthly standard deviation of Short selling is multiplied by the coefficient estimate reported in Table IV , obtaining the implied effect on the stock return of one standard-deviation increase in Short selling. For example, from Panel A the coefficient estimate for the 1-month horizon is 0.0471 for hedging firms, and 0.1125 for non-hedging firms. The monthly standard deviation of Short selling is about 0.05. Thus the implied effect on the stock return is 0.0471 0.05 0.0024, or 0.24% for hedging firms, and 0.1096 0.05 0.0056, or 0.56% for non-hedging firms, at the 1-month horizon. Similar calculations yield the implied effects at subsequent horizons, which are then cumulated to obtain the 6-month implied cumulative returns plotted in Figure 1 . In comparison, Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) find effects of similar size. In their Table 1 , an increase in short interest from the 5 th to the 95 th percentile is associated with a 1.7% monthly excess return, or 20% annualized. In our sample, this would correspond to an increase in Short selling of 0.12 (Table I , panel A), associated with a 0.1096 0.12 1.3% monthly excess return, or 16% annualized, for non-hedging firms ( 7%, annualized, for the hedging firms).
the case of non-hedging firms, the analysts will gradually revise their recommendations, as they learn the negative information on which the short sellers have traded.
We thus estimate a series of regressions of changes in analyst recommendations in months 1, 2, … , 6 on short selling intensity in month , in the spirit of model (3):
Each series of regressions is separately estimated for hedging and non-hedging firms. Δ is the monthly change in the consensus (average) analyst recommendation on stock in month . Analyst recommendations, retrieved from the IBES database, are coded as a number from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to "strong buy" and 5 to "strong sell" -thus, a positive Δ is associated with a worsening consensus analyst recommendation. The monthly analyst recommendation revision in month is simply the difference between the average analyst recommendation as of month and the average recommendation as of month 1. is the intensity of short selling on stock in month , defined as Short selling or Utilization ratio. is a vector of control variables including Prior return, D/E ratio, Institutional holdings, Cash flow, and stock and date fixed effects. In addition, rather than adjusting the dependent variable for size and book-to-market as in model (3), also includes the average change in analyst recommendation for all stocks belonging to the same size and book-tomarket portfolio as stock .
The estimates are reported in Table VII, The estimates, as well as Figure 2 , imply that, subsequent to a short sale, there is little evidence that analysts revise their recommendations for hedging firms. In contrast, in the case of non-hedging firms, the implied revisions can be substantial. One standard-deviation increase in Short selling is associated with a recommendation revision of slightly more than 1.5 points (on the 1-5 scale) over a 6-month period for non-hedging firms, corresponding to a downward recommendation revision from "neutral" to nearly "strong sell." The implied recommendation change is less than 0.5 points for hedging firms.
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These results suggest that analyst recommendations on hedging firms already incorporate the negative information of the short sellers. In other words, corporate hedging is associated with an improved efficiency of the providers of public information, i.e. the analysts.
Conclusion
We study the informational role of corporate hedging, running a horse race between two alternative hypotheses: "transparency" and "opacity". Under the transparency hypothesis, corporate hedging improves transparency and reduces uncertainty about firm value. This erodes the informational advantage of the more informed traders in the market, who can then expect lower profits by trading on their private information on the stocks of corporate hedgers. Under the opacity hypothesis, corporate hedging actually makes the firm more opaque to outsiders, thus increasing potential profits for more informed traders.
Using hand-collected data on corporate hedging, and a novel data base on US equity short sellers -the traditionally more informed traders in the market, we provide evidence consistent with the transparency hypothesis. Corporate hedgers appear more transparent, under a variety of measures (analyst forecast dispersion, breadth of institutional ownership, implied volatility). Furthermore, their stocks are less subject to informed trading, both based on general measures such as PIN and return Rsquare, as well as on direct measures of short selling. And indeed, consistent with the transparency hypothesis, short sellers can expect smaller profits on the shares of corporate hedgers. Our results indicate an important, and so far neglected, effect on corporate hedging on the behavior of informed investors, and in particular short sellers: the reduction in uncertainty associated with hedging renders 27 The effects described are based on the IR/FX hedging indicator. Similar effects, also depicted in Figure 2 , obtain with the IR and FX indicators.
short selling less profitable, leading to a lower short selling intensity. Interestingly, they also suggest that corporate hedging contracts, designed to limit exposure to "macro" sources of risk such as foreign exchange or interest rate shocks, can impact the behavior of investors, such as the short sellers, who typically trade on firm-specific information.
Appendix A. Corporate Hedging and Informed Trading
This Appendix illustrates the intuition at the basis of our tests, with the aid of a simplified version of the Kyle (1985) model that incorporates corporate hedging and taxation. A convex tax schedule creates an incentive for the firm to hedge. At the same time, hedging reduces the uncertainty around firm value, and thus the ability of informed traders (short sellers) to trade profitably. Thus, in the presence of corporate hedging we should expect less short selling, and less negative stock returns conditional on short selling.
Timing, cash flows, and corporate taxation
There are three dates (0, 1, 2), a firm, a market maker, and investors, who are universally risk neutral and have discount rate equal to 0. At 2 , the firm generates before-tax cash flows , , , with Pr .
The corporate income tax schedule is given by:
with . This is the simplest convex tax schedule. Smith and Stulz (1985) , Graham and Smith (1999) , and Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) argue that tax convexity favors hedging -the same is true here, as becomes clear below.
At 0, the expected after-tax terminal cash flow ′ is:
where Δ 1 is the difference in the after-tax terminal cash flows in the two possible states of the world at 2.
Investors, stock prices, and expected returns
There are two classes of investors:
(i) Informed trader: At a cost 0, she can observe at 1. She then conditions her trade on this information, making an order equal to if , and if . The informed trader's cost is drawn from a uniform distribution over 0, , independent of all other random quantities in the model.
(ii) Liquidity traders: For exogenous reasons, they submit an aggregate order flow , , with Pr , independent of all other random quantities in the model.
We proceed as follows. First, we obtain market prices at 1. Second, we compute the ex-ante expected profits to the informed trader, denoted by . Third, we find the market price at 0, which, given universal risk neutrality, must be
Stock price at 1. Assume for now that and the informed trader trades. As in Kyle (1985) , (C) , . Here the order flow reveals no information to the market maker: it could be , or , . These outcomes occur with probabilities 1 /2 and /2. In either case, the market maker sets Δ .
Profits of the informed trader.
The informed trader profits from deviations between the market price and the actual terminal after-tax cash flows. Her ex-ante expected profit is thus:
Thus, the informed trader's profits are a function of the uncertainty around firm value 1 Δ .
The informed trader will only trade if .
Stock price at 0. The stock price at 0 is:
Expected returns conditional on short selling. Suppose that the informed trader sells at 1, i.e.
there is an amount of short selling . Then, the expected return between 1 and 2 is:
The greater the insider's profits, the more negative the stock return conditional on short selling.
Corporate hedging and short selling
Enter corporate hedging. While the literature suggests a number of alternative mechanisms through which corporate hedging can reduce uncertainty (cf. DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991, 1995) , we abstract from any one particular mechanism and simply assume that hedging acts as a mean-preserving "shrinkage" of the distribution of the 2 cash flows. In other words, if the firm hedges, the terminal cash flows will be , , Pr , with . Thus, it can pay no taxes, with the same expected before-tax terminal cash flow 1 . The expected after-tax 28 In cases (A) and (B), the price fully reveals the informed trader's information, and she makes no profit. In case (C), if the informed trader's expected profit is 1 Δ 1 Δ . The same expression obtains in case (C) if , yielding expression (A.3).
cash flows are also 1 , while with no hedging we have 1
. Under these assumptions, the firm strictly prefers to hedge. This captures the incentives to hedge generated by the convex tax schedule (the larger , the greater the convexity of the tax schedule, the more the firm will want to hedge).
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What does this imply for the informed trader's profits? They will be 1 Δ , with Δ 2 . Recall that under no hedging, the informed trader's profits are given by If the informed trader does trade, the stock price at 0 will be Δ . Moreover, the expected return between 1 and 2, conditional on short selling, will be:
The above expression is greater (less negative) than the return in (A.4), because Δ Δ . Thus, under corporate hedging, on average the stock price drops less subsequent to a short sale.
The "treatment effect" of corporate hedging on short selling intensity, i.e. the expected drop in short selling given corporate hedging, is given by the drop in the probability that the informed trader trades and the before-tax cash flow realization is . It is thus equal to:
where the inequality follows from the fact that .
Appendix B. Variable definitions IR/FX, FX, IR corporate hedging indicators
Indicator variables equal to one if a given firm in a given year is a foreign exchange (FX) hedger, an interest rate (IR) hedger, or engages in both kinds of hedging (IR/FX). Information on corporate hedging policies is handcollected from company 10-K and 10-Q filings, following the keyword search procedure described in the text.
Short Selling, Utilization Ratio, Lendable Ratio
Short selling intensity on a given stock. On a given calendar month, Short Selling is defined as the ratio of the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling, divided by the number of shares outstanding. The Utilization Ratio is defined as the ratio of the quantity of shares borrowed for short selling, divided by the number of shares available for lending. The Lendable Ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of shares available for lending, divided by the number of shares outstanding. The quantity of shares borrowed for short selling and the number of shares available for lending are obtained from the Data Explorer data base. The number of shares outstanding is retrieved from the CRSP database. In the regressions on yearly data, the monthly short selling intensity variables are averaged across one calendar year.
Excess return
Monthly stock return minus the return on a matching size and book-to-market portfolio. Stock returns are obtained from CRSP. The returns on the matching size and book-to-market portfolios are from Kenneth French's website. To limit outliers, the excess returns data are Winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles.
Breadth of ownership/Breadth of ownership (all inst. investors)
Number of mutual funds (resp. all 13F institutional investors) holding the stock in a given calendar quarter, divided by the number of mutual funds (all 13F institutional investors) active in the US equity market in that quarter (Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002)). Data on mutual fund (institutional investor) equity ownership are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings data base.
Analyst forecast dispersion
In a given calendar month, analyst forecast dispersion is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation of analyst one-year EPS forecasts divided by the stock price at the end of the previous month. Monthly observations are then averaged (with weights proportional to analyst coverage) to obtain a yearly frequency data. Data on analyst forecasts are retrieved from the IBES data base.
Change in analyst consensus recommendation
The IBES database codes analyst recommendations on a scale from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell), i.e. a higher value denotes more negative analyst recommendations. For each stock, we consider the consensus (average) recommendation . We then compute monthly changes in the consensus recommendation as Δ . The average Δ across all stocks belonging to a given size and book-to-market portfolio at a given calendar month is the Δ _ variable.
PIN
Index of the probability of informed trading, based on the structural model of Easley, Hvidkjaer, O'Hara (2002) .
Return R-square R-square from a regression of weekly stock returns on market and industry returns, as in Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) . It is estimated by running a separate regression for each stock and calendar year.
Convexity
Following Graham and Smith (1999) Taxable income is between -$500,000 and $0 ($0 and $500,000). The volatility of taxable income and its serial correlation are calculated on a rolling basis, using all available historical annual data up to the year of interest.
Foreign income ratio/No foreign income (Y/N)
Foreign income ratio is an index of the incidence of foreign generated profits (or losses) on the firm's overall income. It is defined as the ratio between the absolute value of foreign income (Compustat data item PIFO) to the sum of the absolute value net of income (data item NI) and the absolute value of foreign income. No foreign income (Y/N) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has no foreign income in a year, zero otherwise.
Size
Natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity (expressed in millions of dollars). The market value of equity is obtained as the product of the stock price (CRSP data item PRC) and shares outstanding (CRSP data item SHROUT, in millions).
BE/ME
Book-to-market value of equity ratio. The market value of equity is obtained as the product of the stock price (CRSP data item PRC) and shares outstanding (CRSP data item SHROUT, in millions). The book value of equity is obtained as shareholders' equity (Compustat data item SEQ), or common equity (data item CEQ) plus preferred stock, or total assets (data item AT) minus total liabilities (data item LT) minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (data item TXDITC) minus postretirement benefit asset (data item PRBA). Preferred stock is estimated at liquidating value (data item PSTKL), if available, otherwise at redemption value (data item PSTKRV), otherwise at book value (data item PSTK). The book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the market value.
D/E ratio
Debt-to-equity ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of equity. Total debt is defined as the sum of long term plus short term debt (Compustat items DLTT and DLC). The book value of equity is obtained as shareholders' equity (Compustat data item SEQ), or common equity (data item CEQ) plus preferred stock, or total assets (data item AT) minus total liabilities (data item LT) minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (data item TXDITC) minus postretirement benefit asset (data item PRBA). Preferred stock is estimated at liquidating value (data item PSTKL), if available, otherwise at redemption value (data item PSTKRV), otherwise at book value (data item PSTK).
Cash flow
Cash flow ratio, defined as the ratio of Income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) plus Depreciation and amortization (data item DP) divided by lagged total assets.
Institutional holdings
Percentage of the outstanding shares held by institutional investors. Institutional holdings are retrieved from the Thompson Reuters 13F database.
Prior return
Cumulative raw return over the previous 12 months. Stock returns are retrieved from CRSP.
Trading volume
For a given firm and calendar month, it is defined as the ratio of traded shares to outstanding shares (both retrieved from CRSP). Monthly observations are then averaged to obtain one observation per firm per year.
Index member
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a given firm is an S&P500 member in a given year, 0 otherwise.
Analyst coverage
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts covering the firm. Analyst coverage data is from IBES.
Table I Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Panel A focuses on the monthly data used in Tables IV and V, Panel B on the yearly data used in the remaining tables. Panels C and D tabulate average intensity of corporate hedging and short selling across the different size-and book-to-market portfolios. Corporate hedging is measured by indicator variables equal to one for either interest rate or foreign exchange risk hedging (IR/FX), just interest rate (IR), or just foreign exchange hedging (FX). Short selling intensity is proxied by the ratio of sales borrowed for short selling to outstanding shares (Short Selling), shares borrowed for short selling to shares available for short selling (Utilization ratio), and shares available for short selling to outstanding shares (Lendable ratio). In all panels, the sample consists of the intersection between the CRSP monthly stocks database, (IR/FX, IR, FX) on determinants on hedging. In column (1), the hedging indicator is IR/FX (interest rate or foreign exchange), in column (2) IR (interest rate), and in columns (3) and (4) it is FX (foreign exchange). Each observation in the sample consists of one firm, in a given year. The sample consists of the intersection between the CRSP monthly stocks database, the Compustat universe, and the DataExplorers short selling database, over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In all panels and specifications, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered around size and book-to-market portfolios in a given year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Hedging:
IR/FX IR FX FX
Convexity 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.022*** (FX) . denotes a vector of control variables including Size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity), book-to-market (BE/ME), leverage, institutional holdings, prior return, analyst coverage, and calendar year fixed effects. In each panel, in columns (1), (3), and (5), the model is estimated with OLS. In columns (2), (4), and (6), the model is estimated with the maximum likelihood treatment regression estimator, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the hedging indicator variable. The number of observations in these columns drops due to the availability Convexity data used to identify the hedging indicator in the first-stage equation (omitted for brevity). The sample is the intersection of the CRSP/Compustat merged database and the DataExplorers short selling database over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In each specification, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered around size and book-to-market portfolios in a given calendar year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
A. Dependent variable: Analyst Forecast Dispersion

Hedging (IR/FX)
Hedging (FX) Hedging (IR)
Hedging ( Cash flow -0.073*** -0.021*** -0.073*** -0.027*** -0.073*** -0.021*** -13.59 -6.34 -13.60 -10.77 -13.58 -6.23 Institutional holdings -0.011*** -0.001 -0.011*** -0.003** -0.011*** -0.003** -5.27 -0.67 -5.34 -2.46 -5.33 -2.51 Prior return -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -5.99 -5.05 -5.98 -5.44 -5.99 -4.20 Prior return -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.072*** -5.43 -4.29 -5.29 -4.06 -5.43 -4 -0.12 -4.23 0.58 1.59 -0.49 -4.98 Cash flow -0.274* -0.970*** -0.250* -0.329* -0.282* -0.917*** -1.90 -4.63 -1.75 -1.75 -1.93 -4.19 Institutional holdings 0.724*** -0.872*** 0.694*** -0.845*** 0.737*** -0.566*** 5.97 -4.56 5.70 -4.59 6.02 -2.98 Prior return -0.214*** -0.188*** -0.206*** -0.161*** -0.215*** -0.200*** -4.66 -3.77 -4.54 -3.38 -4.67 -3.91 Year Hedging (IR) -0.059*** -0.241*** -14.12 -19.65 Size -0.037*** -0.020*** -0.041*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.019*** -14.90 -7.30 -16.61 -11.02 -14.23 -7.03 BE/ME -0. -3.24 3.17 -4.99 -3.65 -1.78 5.74 Cash flow -0.319*** -0.306*** -0.330*** -0.371*** -0.318*** -0.316*** -17.16 -12.03 -17.80 -15.22 -17.24 -13.45 Institutional (FX) . denotes a vector of control variables including size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity), book-to-market (BE/ME), leverage, cash flow, institutional holdings, prior return, and calendar year fixed effects. In columns (1), (3), and (5), the model is estimated with OLS. In columns (2), (4), and (6), the model is estimated with the maximum likelihood treatment regression estimator, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the hedging indicator variable. The number of observations in these columns drops due to the availability Convexity data. In both panels, the sample is the intersection of the CRSP/Compustat merged database and the DataExplorers short selling database over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In each specification, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered around the firm's size and book-tomarket portfolio in a given calendar year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Institutional holdings -4.263*** -2.206*** -4.318*** -3.437*** -4.275*** -3.221*** -8.43 -3.89 -8.45 -4.61 -8.55 -5.72 Prior return -0.769*** -0.920*** -0.772*** -0.887*** -0.769*** -0.876*** -6.47 -7.72 -6.53 -7.75 -6.44 -7.56 Analyst coverage -1.509*** -1.340*** -1.500*** -1.107*** -1.525*** -1.239*** -8.70 -7.58 -8.57 -5.51 -8.91 -6.88 Year (FX) . denotes a vector of control variables including Size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity), book-to-market (BE/ME), leverage, institutional holdings, prior return, analyst coverage, and calendar year fixed effects (panels B and C omit the coefficient estimates on the control variables for brevity). In all panels, in columns (1), (3), and (5), the model is estimated with OLS. In columns (2), (4), and (6), the model is estimated with the maximum likelihood treatment regression estimator, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the hedging indicator variable. The number of observations in these columns drops due to the availability Convexity data. In all panels, the sample is the intersection of the CRSP/Compustat merged database and the DataExplorers short selling database over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In each specification, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered around the firm's size and book-to-market portfolio in a given calendar year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
A. Short Selling
Hedging (IR/ FX)
Hedging (FX) Hedging (IR) Cash flow -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -4.02 -3.10 -4.58 -3.29 -4.00 -3.45 Institutional holdings 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.042*** Cash flow -0.133*** -0.127*** -0.139*** -0.161*** -0.135*** -0.143*** -8.98 -3.96 -9.41 -5.05 -9.12 -4.35 Institutional holdings -0.072*** -0.059*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.054** 1, 2, . .., 6 months subsequent to a short sale on short-selling intensity in a given calendar month t:
Each series of regressions is estimated separately for firms that engage in corporate hedging (Hedging firms) and firms that do not (Non-hedging firms). is the return on stock in month minus the return on the corresponding size and book-to-market matched portfolio.
is the intensity of short selling on stock in month , defined as the ratio between the number of shares borrowed for short selling and the number of shares outstanding.
is a vector of control variables, including in all specifications and both panels firm and calendar date fixed effects, as well as Prior return. In panel B, the baseline specification is augmented, to include the additional control variables: Institutional holdings, D/E ratio and Cash flow (defined in the Appendix). The rows labeled Hedging firms refer to the regressions run on the stocks of firms that perform corporate risk management, while those labeled Non-hedging firms refer to the regressions run on the stocks of firms with no corporate risk management in place. The row labeled Test reports the test statistic for the difference between the coefficient on Short Selling (Utilization Ratio) in the Hedging firms regression and in the Nonhedging firms regression. The sample consists of the intersection between the CRSP monthly stocks database, the Compustat universe, and the DataExplorers short selling database, over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In all panels and specifications, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered around size and book-to-market portfolios at a given calendar date. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Non-hedging firms(IR/FX) Short selling -0.1125*** -0.1001*** -0.0740*** -0.0741*** -0.0726*** -0.0505*** -8.36 -7.06 -5.30 -5.15 -4.84 -3.13 -4.20 -3.39 -2.53 -2.26 -1.78 -1.90 Non-hedging firms(IR/FX) Short selling -0.1168*** -0.1022*** -0.0757*** -0.0773*** -0.0769*** -0.0570*** -7.86 -6.54 -4.97 -4.88 -4.68 -3.26 Table VII Changes in Analyst Recommendations Following Short Selling The table reports the estimates of a series of regressions of changes in analyst recommendations 1, 2, ..., 6 months subsequent to a short sale on the initial short-selling intensity:
A. Baseline specification (Short selling)
Each series of regressions is estimated separately for firms that perform corporate risk management (Hedging firms) and firms that do not perform risk management (Non-hedging firms). Δ is the monthly change in the consensus (average) analyst recommendation on stock in month . Analyst recommendations, retrieved from the IBES database, are coded as a number from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to a strong buy and 5 to a strong sell -thus, a positive Δ is associated with a worsening consensus analyst recommendation. The monthly change in consensus analyst recommendation in month is the difference between the average analyst recommendation as of month and the average recommendation as of month 1. is the intensity of short selling on stock in month , defined as the ratio between the number of shares borrowed for short selling and the number of shares outstanding.
is a vector of control variables, including in all specifications and both panels firm and calendar date fixed effects as well as Prior return and Δ _ , the average change in analyst recommendation for all stocks belonging to the same size and book-to-market portfolio as stock i. In panel B, the baseline specification is augmented, to include the additional control variables: Institutional holdings, D/E ratio and Cash flow (defined in the Appendix). The rows labeled Hedging firms refer to the regressions run on the stocks of firms that perform corporate risk management, while those labeled Non-hedging firms refer to the regressions run on the stocks of firms with no corporate risk management in place. The row labeled Test reports the test statistic for the difference between the coefficients on Short selling (Utilization ratio) in the Hedging firms regression and in the Non-hedging firms regression. The sample consists of the intersection between the IBES database, the CRSP monthly stocks database, the Compustat universe, and the DataExplorers short selling database, over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In all panels and specifications, the tstatistics are based on standard errors clustered around size and book-to-market portfolios at a given calendar date. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. corresponding untabulated specifications) to obtain the implied excess return at for one standard-deviation increase in Short selling (Utilization ratio) as of . The graph plots the cumulative excess returns thus obtained. 
